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FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME COLLISION LITIGATION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH

International admiralty claimants are beginning to lose their
traditional privilege of suing in U.S. courts.' Congested dockets
have prompted the U.S. admiralty courts to apply the doctrine of
forum non conveniens (FNC) more frequently to decline jurisdiction
over disputes having substantial foreign connections. 2 U.S. claimants, for example, formerly only needed to assert their citizenship for
1. See Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, [1980] Am. Mar.
Cas. 309 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980) (U.S. admiralty plaintiff dismissed under forum non conveniens despite adverse change of law). Other recent
cases dismissing U.S. claimants include: Bielefeld v. Walleniusrederierna and Karl
Geuther & Co., [1977] Am. Mar. Cas. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v.
Astro Exito Navegacion S.A., Panama, 437 F. Supp. 331, [1977] Am. Mar. Cas. 1727
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bernuth Lembcke, Co. v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, [1976] Am. Mar.
Cas. 2175 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Cf. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (non-admiralty
U.S. plaintiff dismissed for forum non conveniens); Mizokami Bros., Inc. v. Boychem
Corp., 556 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (non-admiralty
U.S. plaintiff dismissed); Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Service Co., 500 F. Supp. 787
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (non-admiralty U.S. plaintiff dismissed); Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist
Corp. v. Fiat S.p.A., 84 F.R.D. 299 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (non-admiralty U.S. plaintiff dismissed). See generally Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited.- A Decade of
Development of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in InternationalLitigation in the
Federal Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 775 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Convenient Forum
Revisited].
2. See, e.g., Domingo v. States Marine Lines, Inc., [1972] Am. Mar. Cas. 937, 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), where the majority expressed serious concern with the docket problem:
It is scarcely necessary to dwell on the fact that this Court is the most heavily
burdened Federal District Court in the country. The Civil Calendar grows more
congested all the time. The priority now properly given to the disposition of
criminal cases tends to increase this congestion. Moreover, the substantial
number of vacancies on a bench of 27 emphasizes the seriousness of the congestion problem. In all likelihood it will be several years, at least, before these cases
can be reached for trial in this district. There is no indication that there would
be any difficulty in obtaining prompt disposition in the Philippine courts.
I see no reason why this Court, with its heavy burdens and responsibilities,
should be burdened with cases like these which, from every point of view, should
be tried in the courts of the nation where all the relevant events occurred and
whose own citizens are primarily involved. Certainly, this district and the Metropolitan area in which it is situated have no conceivable relation to this litigation except for the fact that the defendant happens to be doing business here.
See also Home Insurance Co. v. S.S. Cuidad de Cumana, [1975] Am. Mar. Cas. 355, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Del Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Corp., S/A, 402 F. Supp. 237, 243,
[1974] Am. Mar. Cas. 1880, 1886 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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the U.S. admiralty courts to retain jurisdiction;3 today, not even U.S.
4
citizenship is enough to avoid an FNC dismissal.
Because FNC is a discretionary doctrine, the U.S. admiralty
courts have had difficulty applying it in a consistent manner.5 They

have cited dictum with regularity and have often ignored prior holdings.6 The outcome of this treatment is a confused FNC doctrine
that is causing litigants to waste time and money because they cannot predict with certainty the outcome of a motion to dismiss on
FNC grounds.7 Clearly, the courts and the admiralty bar need a
more reasoned FNC doctrine that will produce more predictable
results.
This Note proposes a more consistent doctrinal approach to
FNC by articulating the factors that U.S. admiralty courts should
consider when deciding whether to decline jurisdiction of international maritime collision cases.8 First, the Note provides a general
discussion of FNC doctrine, highlighting the current confusion in
the application of FNC to international maritime collision cases.
The Note then describes those aspects of admiralty law and maritime collision litigation with which an effective FNC doctrine must
comport. Finally, the Note considers the propriety of current FNC
3. See, e.g., States Marine Lines, Inc. v. M/V Kokei Maru, 180 F. Supp. 255, 257,
[1960] Am. Mar. Cas. 887, 889 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (damage action by U.S. steamship owner
against Japanese ship and her owner following collision in Japanese harbor). See also
Recent Decisions, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 690, 697-98 (1979).
4. Del Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Corp., S/A, 402 F. Supp. 237, [1974] Am. Mar.
Cas. 1880 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (U.S. claimant in a contract action dismissed under FNC);
Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v. Astro Exito Navegacian S.A., Panama, 437 F. Supp. 331, [1977]
Am. Mar. Cas. 1727 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (U.S. collision claimant dismissed under FNC).
See generally Recent Decisions, supra note 3.
5. Compare,e.g., Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d
463, [1957] Am. Mar. Cas. 57 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) (jurisdiction retained) with Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908,
912, [1959] Am. Mar. Cas. 511, 516 (E.D. Va. 1959) (jurisdiction declined, the court noting that "[t]he recent case of Motor Distributors ... is admittedly somewhat analogous
to the facts herein submitted."); cf. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as
Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters ofAdmiralty, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 19 (1949)
("[T]he development [of FNC] has been much like that of the proverbial Topsy, and the
cases have often seemed to observers to defy analysis and rational classification."); Note,
Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintffs in the Federal Courts, 69 GEo. L.J. 1257,
1261 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, ForeignPlainiffs] (despite Gilbert, see infra notes
27-33 and accompanying text, the lower courts have failed to develop standards for balancing private and public interests so as to ensure reliable and predictable FNC
decisions).
6. See infra note 46.
7. Bickel, supra note 5, at 19.
8. This Note focuses on collisions because they give rise to more litigation than any
other aspect of the shipping industry, except personal injury claims. See generally G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 485 (1975) (discussing the frequency of
collision).
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doctrine in international maritime collision cases and suggests a
more workable and doctrinally consistent alternative.
I
BACKGROUND
A. FNC

DOCTRINE

FNC is both an equitable and discretionary doctrine. 9 It permits a court to decline jurisdiction of a suit that could have been
brought in another, more appropriate, forum. 10 FNC presupposes
that jurisdiction and venue are proper where the plaintiff brought
suit, but that at least one additional forum exists where jurisdiction
and venue also would have been proper."I Courts considering its use
presume that the plaintiffs choice of forum is fair. Thus, FNC
should be used rarely and then only to prevent harassment of
defendants,12 or to resist imposition on the court's docket of disputes
having no connection with the forum state. 13
L Early History

FNC originated in the Scottish courts and gradually made its
way into American decisional law.' 4 Initially, U.S. admiralty courts
16
15
applied FNC only in actions between foreigners. The Belgenland
and Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamshps, Ltd., 17 two early

cases involving actions between foreigners, established the rules that
9. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947).
10. See id at 506-07.
11. Id at 507.
12. Id
13. Id at 504. There is some suggestion in Gilbert that FNC primarily was directed
at misuses of venue statutes, except in the admiralty courts. In admiralty there are no
venue statutes, and FNC has been used to decline jurisdiction of foreign disputes. Id at
507.
14. The earliest reported Scottish case to discuss the notion of FNC was McMaster v.
McMaster, 1833 S. Sess. Cas. 685 (2d Div. Scotland). See Barrett, The DoctrineofForum
Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908 (1947). See generally Paulsen & Burrick, Forum Non
Conveniens in Admiralty: The Availability of the U.S. Courtsfor Trial ofMaritime Cases
Arising Outside U.S. TerritorialWaters, 17 FORUM 1350, 1352-59 (1982). U.S. admiralty
courts originally applied FNC as a means to control admiralty's broad jurisdiction and
unlimited venue. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 154, [1980]
Am. Mar. Cas. 309, 319 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
15. Compare Recent Decisions, supra note 3, at 697 ("The older view was that a U.S.
plaintiff suing in his own right had an absolute right of access to U.S. courts.") and
Bolden v. Jensen, 70 F. 505 (D. Wash. 1895) (a U.S. citizen is "entitled to redress in a
court of his own country") with Swift & Co. Packers v. Companie Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 697 (1950) (Court declined to answer the abstract question of whether a
U.S. admiralty court may ever decline jurisdiction over actions brought by U.S. citizens).
16. 114 U.S. 355 (1885).
17. 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
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some U.S. admiralty courts still follow in such suits.' Other early
decisions suggest that FNC did not apply to U.S. claimants because
citizens enjoyed a right of access to U.S. admiralty courts.19
Although the Supreme Court alluded to the issue in Swf/? & Co.
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 20 it has never
actually decided whether FNC applies to actions by U.S. citizens in

the U.S. admiralty courts.2 1 In Swift, the Court stated in dictum that
some U.S. admiralty courts still quote22 that the application of FNC
against a U.S. citizen brings into force "considerations very different

from those in suits between foreigners. '2 3 The Court seemed to say
that FNC could apply to citizens' actions, but should be used rarely,
and only after consideration of special factors. Since Swft, the
Supreme Court has made no pronouncement concerning FNC in the

context of citizens' actions. As a result, the district courts are uncertain as to the weight properly accorded U.S. citizenship under FNC;

most courts currently consider it to be a significant but not determinative factor.2 4
2

Modern FNC: Gilbert andKoster
Three years before Swft, the Supreme Court had extended

FNC to all federal courts by its decisions in two non-admiralty cases:
Gilbert v. Guf Oil Corp.2 5 and Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co..26 Gilbert involved the application of FNC in a domestic
18. E.g., Poseiden Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. M/S Netuno, 474 F.2d 203, [1973] Am.
Mar. Cas. 1180 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing The Belgenland to retain jurisdiction over a collision between foreign vessels on Lake Huron); Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T Mina
D/Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908, [1959] Am. Mar. Cas. 511 (E.D. Va. 1959) (citing Canada
Malting to decline jurisdiction of a collision claim brought by a British insurer of a British vessel against an Italian vessel arising from a collision off the coast of Spain). Both
The Belgenlandand CanadaMalting involved actions between foreigners. In he Belgenland,the parties were of different flags. 114 U.S. at 356. Accordingly, the Court retained
jurisdiction on the ground that, as between foreigners of different flags, the U.S. could
offer a neutral forum. Id at 369. By contrast, CanadaMalting involved parties of the
same flag. 285 U.S. at 423. The Court there declined jurisdiction, noting that because
"the parties were not only foreigners, but were citizens of Canada" the litigation could be
conducted more appropriately in a Canadian tribunal. Id
19. The Epsom, 227 F. 158 (W.D. Wash. 1915); The Falls of Keltie, 114 F. 357 (D.
Wash. 1902); Bolden v. Jensen, 70 F. 505 (D. Wash. 1895). See also supra note 15.
20. 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
21. See Recent Decisions, supra note 3, at 695.
22. Eg., Mobil Tankers Co., S.A. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614, [1966]
Am. Mar. Cas. 1993, 1996 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966).
23. 339 U.S. at 697.
24. Eg., John Fabrick Tractor Co. v. Penelope Shipping Co., 278 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (jurisdiction retained in action brought by U.S. plaintiff against foreign
ship arising out of a collision on the high seas).
25. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
26. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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tort suit.27 There, plaintiff was a Virginia resident who sued in the
federal district court in New York. 28 The Supreme Court affirmed a
FNC dismissal upon defendant's showing that the balance of conveniences pointed to a trial in Virginia, the place the tort had
occurred. 29 Gilbert listed the factors important to a FNC determination in the federal courts, dividing them into two groups: private
interest factors andpublic interest factors. 30 Theprivate interest factors included: (1) "the relative ease of access to sources of proof';
(2) the "availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling" witnesses; (3) "the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses"; (4) possible "view of the premises," if appropriate; and
(5) "all other practical problems that make a trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive."'3 ' Thepublic interest factors included:
(1) "administrative difficulties" caused when "litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin"; (2) the
imposition of jury duty "upon the people of a community which has
no relation to the litigation"; (3) the "local interest in having localized [sic] controversies decided at home"; and (4) the court's difficulties with choice-of-law problems and the application of foreign
32
law.
Gilbert was silent about the relative weight to be accorded the
public and private interest factors, and about which factors within
each group are most important. The Court reiterated the traditional
deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum, stating that a federal
court should not invoke FNC unless the balance of conveniences
33
strongly favors an alternate forum.
Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., Gilbert's companion case, also dealt with FNC in domestic litigation. 34 In Koster,
plaintiff was a New York resident bringing a derivative action in the
federal district court in New York. 35 The Supreme Court, presumably referring to the availability of multiple "home forums" in derivative actions, affirmed a FNC dismissal because of "special problems
of [FNC] which inhere in derivative actions. ' 36 The Court noted
that where there are only two parties to a dispute, a plaintiff suing in
his home forum "should not be deprived of the presumed advan27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 501.
Id at 502.
Id at 509-12.
Id at 508.
Id
Id at 508-09.
Id
Koster, 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
Id
Id at 521.
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tages of his home jurisdiction except upon a clear showing of facts
which either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation to 37a
defendant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience,"
or (2) "make trial in the chosen forum inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal
'38
problems.
Gilbert and Koster laid the foundation of modem FNC doctrine

in U.S. admiralty courts; they represented a subtle but important
change in the way U.S. admiralty courts viewed the doctrine. Gilbert
appeared to encourage the admiralty courts to use FNC more readily
39
by providing them with a list of factors to consider in each case.
Similarly, Koster appeared to signal a liberalization of prevailing
doctrine insofar as it applied FNC for the first time in the federal
40
courts to oust a plaintiff from his home forum.
Shortly after Gilbert and Koster, Congress added section
1404(a) to the Judicial Code.4 1 That section authorized the federal

courts to transfer any civil action to a more appropriate district "for
'42

the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.
Thus, section 1404(a) replaced FNC in all situations where the alternative forum is in the United States. 43 FNC remained relevant in
international litigation in the federal courts, where Gilbert and Koster articulated the concerns relevant to courts deciding whether to

decline jurisdiction of actions having substantial foreign
connections."
37. Id at 524.
38. Id
39. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09. When the Supreme Court decided Gilbert and Koster, FNC dismissals in the federal courts were uncommon. See id at 508. Before Gilbert, no authoritative FNC standard had been stated, so that federal courts retained
jurisdiction partly to avoid reversal on appeal, and partly because "courts experience a
certain degree of discomfort in 'abdicating' a jurisdiction which is theirs." Bickel, supra
note 5, at 33. By extending FNC to all federal courts, the Court encouraged the use of
FNC in non-admiralty cases, and seemed to approve a more liberal use of FNC in admiralty cases as well.
40. Koster, 330 U.S. at 518. Koster notwithstanding, the U.S. courts did not invoke
FNC in international litigation against a citizen suing in his own right until the district
court opinion in Hoffman v. Goberman. The decision was appealed and reversed. Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1970). See Convenient Forum Revisited, supra
note I, at 785 n.178.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district where it might have been brought." The courts have construed § 1404(a) to make
transfers under it less harsh on plaintiffs than dismissals under FNC had been. See, e.g.,
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (state law of transferor court will apply in the
transferee forum).
42. 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1976).
43. See Recent Decision, supra note 3, at 691 n.9.
44. See id at 692, 695.
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3. FNC in InternationalMaritime Collision Cases: Doctrinal
Confusion
Since the Swift decision, the Supreme Court has not addressed
45
the application of FNC in international admiralty litigation.
Instead, the Court has left it to the lower admiralty courts to cope
with the confficting array of FNC precedents. 4 6 The result has been
a confused application of FNC, particularly in international maritime collision cases. 47
45. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the Court addressed FNC in
a different international context. Piper involved a plane crash in Scotland that killed the
Scottish pilot and five Scottish passengers. Id at 238-39. The survivors hired an American administratrix to provide a basis for suing the plane's manufacturer in the United
States. Id at 239-40. In the U.S., the plaintiffs could avail themselves of strict liability
law, which was unavailable in Great Britain. Id at 240. The Supreme Court dismissed
on the grounds of FNC, stating that an adverse change in applicable substantive law
"should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the [FNC]
inquiry." Id at 247. In the context of this Note, Pper can be distinguished on two
grounds. First, the Piper decision does not concern international admiralty collision litigation. Second, the plaintiff in Poer was nominal. It must be noted, however, that to the
extent this Note suggests evaluating the content of foreign substantive law as a part of the
FNC inquiry, see infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text, it is inconsistent with Piper.
46. The major Supreme Court FNC decisions include: Swift & Co. Packers v. Companie Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950); Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U.S. 413 (1932); and The Belgenland, 114 U.S.
355 (1885).
The LBelgenland and CanadaMalting govern suits between foreigners. Swift and Koster govern suits involving U.S. claimants. If limited to its facts, Gilbert applies only to
suits by foreigners; however, it has been cited in cases involving U.S. claimants. E.g.,
Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. 309 (2d
Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). Swif? and The Belgenland resulted
in the retention of jurisdiction, while Gilbert,Koster, and CanadaMalting each resulted
in the Court's declining jurisdiction. With respect to their facts, then, these cases are
rather incoherent. No court has attempted to reconcile all these decisions. Instead, lower
courts indiscriminately cite these cases to support wildly varying outcomes. Compare
Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463, [1957] Am. Mar.
Cas. 57 (5th Cir. 1956) (jurisdiction retained) with Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T
Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908, 912, [1959] Am. Mar. Cas. 511, 516 (E.D. Va. 1959)
(jurisdiction retained, the court noting that "[t]he recent case of Motor Distributors is
admittedly somewhat analagous to the facts herein submitted.").
Gilbert'spublic andprivateinterest factors may have played a large role in muddying
the waters of FNC in international maritime collision cases. Cf "The broad and indefinite discretion left to the federal courts to decide the question of convenience from a
welter of factors which are relevant to such a judgment, will inevitably produce a complex of close and indistinguishable decisions from which accurate prediction of the
proper forum will become difficult, if not impossible." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 510, 516 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
47. The MIVNordic Regent history provides an excellent example of how the courts
dispute the proper FNC standard in international marine collision cases. The district
court handed down the firstM/VNordicRegent opinion in 1978. 453 F. Supp. 10, [1978]
Am. Mar. Cas. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed the plaintiff's dismissal in a split panel decision, one judge concurring and the third dissenting.
[1979] Am. Mar. Cas. 13 (2d Cir. 1978). Later, the Second Circuit granted plaintiff's
petition for rehearing and subsequently reversed the dismissal, with the judge who wrote
the original affirmance writing a vigorous dissent. [1979] Am. Mar. Cas. I (2d Cir. 1979).
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In international maritime collision cases involving foreign
plaintiffs, the courts have traditionally used a number of FNC standards which tend to be less analytical than descriptive of an attitude
favoring retention of jurisdiction. 48 This strict view of FNC has
resulted in few dismissals, 49 and has become a virtualper se rule in
the Fifth Circuit. 50 It reflects a judicial attitude that retention is the
rule and dismissal the rare exception. 51 According to the strict view,
52
mere inconvenience is not grounds for an FNC dismissal.
In contrast, recent court decisions evince a more liberal
approach to FNC in international maritime collision suits involving

foreign claimants. 53 This liberal approach reflects a judicial view
The Second Circuit granted a second rehearing, this time on defendant's petition, and
reversed its previous decision, once again affirming the dismissal. 654 F.2d 147, [1980]
Am. Mar. Cas. 309 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
48. E.g., Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210
F.2d 754, 755-57, [1954] Am. Mar. Cas. 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1954) ("[Wlhere such controversies are communisjuris, - that is, where they arise under the common law of nations, special grounds should appear to induce the court to deny its aid to a foreign suitor.")
(quoting The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 365 (1884)); Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf
Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463, 465, [1957] Am. Mar. Cas. 57, 60 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957) ("[Tlhe rule is ... that jurisdiction should be taken
unless to do so would work an injustice."); Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/V Larry L.,
[1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529, 2532 (D.S.C. 1973) (In the course of dismissing a foreign
plaintiff, the court summarized as follows: "[Tihe burden is upon the defendant ... to
prove that the interests ofjustice ... require that the case be heard elsewhere, and ... if
the defendant meets that burden, it is within my discretion, taking all factors into
account, either to retain jurisdiction or decline it.").
49. See Bickel, supra note 5, at 33, 39. Cf. Note, The Convenient ForumAbroad, 20
STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (1967) ("Contrary to the development noted by Professor Bickel,
the recent trend is toward increased willingness to dismiss alien-alien commercial
actions for forum non conveniens grounds."). Dismissals of foreign claimants include:
Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/V Larry L., [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529 (D.S.C. 1973);
Transomnia, G.M.B.H. v. M/S Toryu, 311 F. Supp. 751, [1970] Am. Mar. Cas. 1686
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908,
[1959] Am. Mar. Cas. 511 (E.D. Va. 1959).
50. See, e.g., Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. M/S Netuno, 335 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.
Ga. 1973), rev'd, 474 F.2d 203, [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 1180 (5th Cir. 1973). On remand,
the district court retained jurisdiction but transferred the case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1404(a), to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 361 F. Supp.
412 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
51. Magnolia Ocean Shipping Corp. v. M/V Marco A Zul, [1981] Am. Mar. Cas.
2971, 2975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
52. Most of the strict view decisions come from the Fifth Circuit. E.g., Poseidon
Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. M/S Netuno, 474 F.2d 203, [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 1180 (5th Cir.
1980); Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957). These cases may be compared with Second
Circuit cases that retain jurisdiction over a foreigner's action, but arrive at that result by
balancing convenience factors. E.g., Latif Bawany Jute Mills, Ltd. v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., [1976] Am. Mar. Cas. 2408 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Cf. A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi v.
Tug Boat Condor, [1979] Am. Mar. Cas. 1696 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (distinguishing the Koster
standard from the strict view of Motor Distributors].
53. See, e.g., Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/V Larry L., [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529
(D.S.C. 1973) (court declined jurisdiction); A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi v. Tug Boat
Condor, [1979] Am. Mar. Cas. 1696 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (court retained jurisdiction).
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that U.S. admiralty courts should not permit suits between foreigners
to impose burdens on court time and resources.5 4 U.S. admiralty
courts adopting this view invoke FNC more readily, often upon
respondent's showing that a foreign forum would be more convenient for the litigants.5 5 In addition, these courts often cite Gilbert's
public interest factors to support their decisions to decline
56
jurisdiction.
In international maritime collision suits involving U.S. claimants, different considerations exist. 57 As with suits between foreigners, however, the predominant practice is for the court to retain

jurisdiction unless the respondent shows that retention of jurisdiction will result in substantial injustice.5 8 Similar to the trend involv-

ing foreign claimants, recent decisions articulate a decidedly more
where U.S. collision claimants
liberal view of FNC doctrine in cases
59
courts.
admiralty
U.S.
in
have sued
The balance of this Note addresses the analytical foundations
and the proper content of a reasoned FNC doctrine that will produce

predictable outcomes in international maritime collision cases. The
current confusion in FNC application stems largely from the failure
of the U.S. admiralty courts to analyze the cases that they cite as
precedent, 60 and a failure to articulate the relevant FNC considera-

tions which comport with the realities of modern maritime collision
54. See Paper Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd. v. Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667,
[1975] Am. Mar. Cas. 2349 (9th Cir. 1975) (action for cargo damage during shipment);
Del Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 237, [1974] Am. Mar. Cas. 1880
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (contract action); Deutsche Rhodiaceta A.G. v. M/V Mississippi, [1974]
Am. Mar. Cas. 236, 236 (W.D. Wash. 1974) ("It is unfortunate that this overburdened
court is asked to litigate matters wholly between foreigners. .. ").
55. See, e.g., Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/V Larry L., [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529
(D.S.C. 1973); Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.
Va. 1959).
56. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v. Afran Transport Co., [1981] Am. Mar. Cas.
1701 (E.D. Pa. 1981); John Fabrick Tractor Co. v. Penelope Shipping Co., 278 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Lloyd Brasiliero Patrimonio Nacional, 85 F.
Supp. 740, [1949] Am. Mar. Cas. 684 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
59. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
Several admiralty courts have dismissed U.S. claimants on FNC grounds. See Del
Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Corp., S.A., 402 F. Supp. 237, [1974] Am. Mar. Cas. 1880
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (dismissing U.S. claimant noting that courts should not give special
weight to corporate plaintiffs place of incorporation); Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v. Astro
Exito Navegacion S.A., Panama, 437 F. Supp. 331, [1977] Am. Mar. Cas. 1727 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (U.S. allision claimant dismissed despite adverse change of liability law); Alcoa
Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. 309 (2d Cir.
1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980) (U.S. admiralty plaintiff dismissed
under FNC despite adverse change of law).
60. See supra note 46.
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litigation. 6 1 Accordingly, the Note next examines modem maritime
collision litigation and articulates the considerations which should
be most relevant to courts facing a motion to dismiss on FNC
62
grounds.

B.
L

THE ADMIRALTY CONTEXT

GeneralPrinciplesof InternationalMaritime Collision Law

Maritime law comprises the private law that deals with the shipping industry, or more particularly, with the carriage of goods and
people over water. 63 In the United States, substantive maritime law
is federal, with the U.S. admiralty courts having primary jurisdiction. 64 Further, because the shipping industry is international, U.S.
admiralty courts often adjudicate disputes with substantial foreign
65
connections.
U.S. maritime law includes a broad spectrum of substantive
law.66 Marine collisions occur with great frequency and, except for

personal injury, give rise to more litigation than any other area of
substantive maritime law. 67 Because of the need to limit the scope of

discussion, this Note focuses on international maritime collisions,
and the following comments apply exclusively to collision liability.
Three features of maritime law are particularly important when
analyzing FNC doctrine in international maritime collision cases.
First, U.S. admiralty courts recognize a broad jurisdiction, 6 8 and no
61. See infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
63. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 1.
64. Id at 2. The state courts are not entirely excluded, however, from trying admiralty suits. The U.S. Constitution extends "the judicial power of the United States" to
"'all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 implemented the constitutional grant, giving the federal district courts
original jurisdiction, but "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat.
73, 76-77 (current version, in somewhat altered language, at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976)).
The "saving clause" has enabled admiralty suitors to bring their actions in state courts
and on the civil side of the federal courts. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 37.
65. E.g., The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885). See also G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK
OF ADMIRALTY LAW 14 (1939) (discussing extent of admiralty jurisdiction over actions

having substantial foreign connections).
66. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 22-31 (enumerating
major types of admiralty actions). The principal types of admiralty actions include suits
on contracts for the carriage of goods; in tort for collision damage; for wrongful death;
for personal injury; to foreclose ship mortgages; to limit shipowners' liability; for salvage
and average; and for maintenance and cure; and on charter parties. Id
67. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 485.

68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) (granting district courts original jurisdiction over a
"civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction"). See generally G. ROBINSON, supra
note 65, at 14-22 (discussing international reach of admiralty courts).
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venue restriction. 69 The major reason for unlimited venue and
broad jurisdiction 70 is the perceived need to permit a collision claimant to sue wherever the offending vessel is found. 7 1 When a collision
occurs, the owner of the negligent vessel is liable to the owners of the
innocent vessel and the owners of the cargo.7 2 In order to sue, however, the innocent parties must find and serve process on the negligent vessel's owner. This can be a difficult task due to the
international character of the shipping industry. Thus, the difficulties of finding and serving process on the offending vessel's owner

innocent parare avoided in the U.S. admiralty courts by permitting
73
itself.
vessel
offending
the
sue
to
and
ties to attach
Broad jurisdiction and unlimited venue serve U.S. interests in
several ways. U.S. cargo and vessel owners may attach foreign ves-

sels and enforce their claims in the United States. Plaintiffs may
thus take advantage of U.S. substantive 74 rules and the more sophis69. Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1873). See Alcoa
Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 153, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. 309, 319
(2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). See also Bickel, supra note 5,
at 32 ("[I]t is in the nature of things for the usual defendant in admiralty, or at least for
the libellant's only security, that is the ship, to be extremely elusive, and it is therefore
part of the fairness to let the libellant sue wherever he has found his security, rather than
force him to chase it over an area that might be as wide as the seven seas.").
70. See supra notes 68 & 69. "The admiralty courts have always considered themselves to be international courts rather than arms of the state in which they happen to be
sitting." Bickel, supra note 5, at 32 n.86.
71. Bickel, supra note 5, at 32.
72. In most collisions, more than one vessel is at fault. Eg., Kloeckner Reederei und
Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d 754, [1954] Am. Mar. Cas. 643 (2d
Cir. 1954), appealdismissedper stipulation, 348 U.S. 801 (1954). In that situation, negligent parties share damages. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397
(1975) (damages to be allocated among the parties proportionately to comparative fault).
Collision liability involves incidental issues such as joint and several liability, contribution, and imputation of fault to cargo. The law on these issues may vary among nations
and influence a collision claimant's choice of forum. See Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/
V Larry L., [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529, 2534-35 (D.S.C. 1973). See generally Brown,
GeneralPrincilesof Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 820 (1977); Kasanin, Cargo Rights and
Responsibilitiesin Collision Cases, 51 TUL. L. REv. 880 (1977).
73. Admiralty libels are either inpersonam, against the vessel owner and asserting his
personal liability, or in rem, against the vessel itself. Bickel, supra note 5, at 35. See
generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8 at 18-40. Admiralty libels may combine in rem and in personam claims. Eg., Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/V Larry L.,
[1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529 (D.S.C. 1973).
74. This assumes that applicable conflicts of law principles would permit U.S. courts
to apply U.S. substantive law. Generally, U.S. substantive law would apply to collisions
in U.S. territorial waters. The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29 (1881). See Mobil Tankers Co.
S/A v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 366 F.2d 611, [1966] Am. Mar. Cas. 1983 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966). See also Berlingieri, Jurisdictionand Choice of Law in
Collision Cases andAn Overview ofthe Concept ofFault anditsApportionment, 51 TUL. L.
Rnv. 866, 870-71 (1977). In collisions on the high seas, the forum state usually applies its
own law. Id A high seas collision claimant could thus invoke U.S. substantive law by
suing in the United States. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 362 (1885). See, e.g., AngloAmerican Grain Co. v. S/T Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908, [1959] Am. Mar. Cas. 511
(E.D. Va. 1959). Moreover, U.S. admiralty courts will apply U.S. limitation of liability
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ticated procedures of U.S. admiralty courts.7 5 Additionally, jurisdiction and unlimited venue permit the U.S. admiralty courts to
entertain foreign claims, and thereby promote international corn-

ity. 76 International comity indirectly promotes U.S. shipping interests by encouraging other maritime nations to adjudicate American

claims.
The second relevant feature of maritime law is that collision liability and limitation of liability rules may vary from nation to
nation, so that a claimant's choice of forum may affect his recovery.7 7

All maritime nations recognize negligence as the basis for

imposing collision liability on vessels and their owners. 78 No such
uniformity, however, prevails with regard to incidental issues such as

defenses, joint and several liability, contribution, and imputation of
fault to cargo. 79 Additionally, the liability ceiling varies significantly

among maritime nations.80 Thus, a collision claimant's choice of
rules regardless of where the collision occurred. The Titanic, 233 U.S. 714 (1914) (holding that limitation of liability rules are procedural). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 8, at 944.
75. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
76. Bickel, supra note 5, at 31; Note, ForeignPlaintiffs,supra note 5, at 1276.
77. See generally Brown, supra note 72; Kasanin, supra note 72; Owen, The Origins
andDevelopment of Marine Collision Law, 51 TUL. L. REV. 759 (1977). Even where two
nations follow similar rules, their interpretations and applications of the rule may vary so
as to produce different results on the same facts. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 8, at 52.
78. See generally Owen, supra note 77, at 781.
79. Many nations have ratified the Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910
and the Limitation of Liability Convention of 1957. The United States has adopted
neither. See id at 798, 807 n.284. U.S. law thus varies significantly from the maritime
law of other nations. For example, nations adhering to the 1910 Convention usually
permit proportional recovery of damages and several liability. Id at 795-98. Until the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. 397 (1975), the
U.S. followed a "divided damages" rule under which offending vessels split the damages,
regardless of the varying degree of comparative fault. Owen, supra note 77, at 798. The
Court's adoption of a proportional recovery rule in Reliable Transfer has brought U.S.
law more in line with the rest of the maritime world. Id Nevertheless, important variances remain. For example, U.S. law recognizes the compulsory pilot defense, inscrutable fault, and some unique non-statutory presumptions. Id at 799, 802. More
importantly, U.S. law recognizes joint and several liability and does not impute fault to
cargo. Kasanin, supra note 72, at 883; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 173.
This means that cargo owners can sue any vessel involved in the collision for the entire
loss. See also Kasanin, supra note 72, at 892-95 (addressing the problem of forum shopping resulting from significant variances in substantive law).
80. See, e.g., Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 147-59,
[1980] Am. Mar. Cas. 309, 327 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
Alcoa's claim against Norcross was for $8 million. Under Trinidad law, Alcoa could
recover at most $576,000. Id Alcoa's actual recovery in the U.S. would have been $3.5
million, the value of the M/V Nordic Regent after the collision. Volk & Cordrey, Forum
Non Conveniens: Two Views on the Decision of the Court ofAppealsfor the Second Circuit
in ,41coa S.S. Co. v. M/VNordic Regent, 12 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 123, 126 n.16 (1981).
Limitation of liability statutes protect shipowners from catastrophic collision liability
and, therefore, encourage entrepreneurs to enter the shipping industry. According to the
theory of respondeat superior, collision liability runs directly to the vessel owner. See
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forum may affect his recovery. It determines how liability is established, how damages are divided among the parties at fault, and how

limitation of liability is computed.
Third, U.S. admiralty courts are in a position to advance U.S.

shipping interests by recognizing broad jurisdiction and unlimited
venue in collision cases, and by applying U.S. law to collisions that
implicate American policies. Presumably, to the extent that a court

applies U.S. law, it advances the U.S. policy underlying that law. In
every case before it, a U.S. admiralty court may weigh the U.S. interests involved and choose to apply U.S. law."' Thus, the more cases
that come before the U.S. admiralty courts, the greater the opportunity that the courts have to further U.S. shipping interests. Further,

if U.S. admiralty courts are open to all international maritime collision claimants, then U.S. cargo and vessel owners are more likely to

receive the benefit of a U.S. policy of international comity in the
supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. Without limitation statutes, risks to shipowners would discourage maritime commerce, as total damages in marine collisions can far
exceed the value of the vessel and the cargo.
Many maritime nations adhere to the Limitation of Liability Convention of 1957,
which establishes a liability ceiling based on the gross tonnage of the vessel. The English
text of the Convention is reprinted at [1975] Am. Mar. Cas. 1971 and in an appendix to
Comment, Limitation of Shipowner'sLiabiliP--TheBrusselsConvention of 1957, 68 YALE
L.J. 1676, 1714 (1959). The United States follows its own limitation statute, 46 U.S.C.
§ 183 (1976), which fixes a liability ceiling equal to the vessel's after-collision value.
Conceivably, then, under the U.S. statute, a vessel's sinking could result in no liability for
its owner in the U.S. courts.
Because limitation statutes are instruments of a nation's shipping policy, they represent
the most significant variance of maritime law among nations. "In 1958 the Maritime
Law Association of the United States. . . concluded that the 'proposed Brussels Convention. . . is not acceptable to or in the best interests of American shipowners, passengers,
maritime labor, or shippers."' G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 823. "The
purpose of the [Limitation of Liability Act] had been to put American shipowning interests on a competitive equality with British interests . . . By judicial manoeuver, the
Supreme Court. . . erected by 1900. . . a structure of limitation law which gave shipowners much more protection than the British counterpart." Id at 820-21. See also id
at 958-59 ("[s]hipping is a matter of close and often anxious governmental concern").
81. This is not to suggest that interest analysis by the U.S. admiralty courts is unfettered or produces results radically different from more traditional choice of law rules.
For example, U.S. admiralty courts probably would apply foreign law in cases involving
collisions that occurred in foreign territorial waters, even though the parties are U.S.
citizens and despite the likelihood that the foreign rule would impose different standards
of conduct than would be applied had the collision occurred in U.S. territorial waters.
See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 489-90; see also A/S Hjalmar Bjorges
Rederi v. Condor, [1979] Am. Mar. Cas. 1696, 1701 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (application of Mexican law); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. M/V Kokei Maru, 180 F. Supp. 255, 257 (N.D.
Cal. 1960) (application of Japanese law). On the other hand, a U.S. admiralty court
would apply U.S. law to a collision on the high seas, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK supra
note 8, at 489-90, and would apply U.S. limitation rules, see supra note 80, as well as U.S.
rules concerning joint and several liability, contribution, and imputation of fault to
cargo, see supra note 72. Thus, to the extent that broad jurisdiction and unlimited venue
permit international collision litigants to sue in the United States, U.S. substantive law is
being applied more than it would be otherwise.
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event that they sue or are sued abroad. Thus, the combination of

broad jurisdiction, unlimited venue, and U.S. laws that advance
American shipping policy, enables U.S. courts to protect and promote U.S. shipping interests.
2. Modern InternationalMaritime Collision Litigation

Four features of modem international maritime collision litigation are especially important when considering FNC in that context.
First, the shipping industry is international in character. In the more

obvious sense, the shipping industry is international because twentieth century commerce is truly global and, therefore, ships sail
throughout the world. In a less obvious sense, the shipping industry
is international because a single vessel may have various national
ties. 82 The various nationalities of the owners, crew, and vessel may,

for example, establish multiple national connections.

83

Second, most maritime collision witnesses are mobile. The most

important witnesses are those that actually see the collision. If the
collision occurs in a harbor or on a river, some witnesses may be

local residents. Crew members on a tug, pier workers, or pilots may,
for example, witness a collision, and they are likely to reside near the
harbor.8 4 Most of the witnesses, however, come from the crews of
the colliding vessels, or from crews of passing vessels. These witnesses, by contrast, are mobile. They reside on the ships and travel
throughout the world with them. In those collisions that occur
beyond sight of land, in coastal waters or in international shipping
82. See, e.g., Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/V Larry L., [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529,
2536-37 (D.S.C. 1973) (vessel flying Greek flag owned by Liberian corporation controlled
by Greek and American shareholders).
83. See, e.g., Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 160, [1980]
Am. Mar. Cas. 309, 330 (2d Cir. 1981) (en bane), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980) (Liberian flag vessel with Italian crew), Texaco Trinidad, Inc. v. Astro Exito Navegacion, S.A.
Panama, 437 F. Supp. 331, 333, [1977] Am. Mar. Cas. 1727, 1728 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Greek
flag vessel with Greek and Indonesian crew owned by Panamanian corporation having
principal place of business in Greece); Peoples Insurance Co. of China v. Theokeetor,
[1975] Am. Mar. Cas. 1711 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (crew manning Greek-owned Panamanian
corporation's vessel made up of Greek and Indonesian sailors). See generally Osieke,
Flagsof Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 604 (1979).
84. The pilot may be a temporary crewmember on one of the colliding vessels, or on
a passing vessel. Vessels hire pilots to navigate them through unfamiliar waters. See
Lugenbuhl & Maki, River Navigation, 51 TUL. L. REv. 1157, 1178 (1977). Port regulations often require entering and leaving vessels to hire a local pilot familiar with the
harbor. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 520. Even if regulations do not
require it, many vessels choose to hire pilots. Id If a local pilot is on board and in
charge at the time of collision, he is likely to be the most significant and helpful witness
from the vessel's crew. First, he is likely to be a seasoned mariner and more familiar with
the harbor conditions than other crew members. Second, because he was in charge, he is
likely to have known the tactical situation immediately before collision. Interview with
David A. Olsen, Esq., admiralty attorney, Lemle, Kelleher, Kohlmeyer and Matthews, in
New Orleans (Aug. 17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Olsen interview].
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lanes,85 none of the witnesses are locals; they come exclusively from
the crews of the vessels themselves.

The other significant witnesses in a maritime collision case are
damage experts. 86 These so-called "surveyors" are usually either

naval architects or marine engineers. 87 Although generally hired
from the major port nearest to the collision scene, they are accustomed to world-wide travel.8 8 After a collision, either the vessel
owner or his marine underwriter contacts legal counsel and arranges
to have the collision investigated. The investigation includes finding
the witnesses and hiring the surveyors. 89 Thus, it is conceivable that
in major collisions overseas, vessel owners or underwriters could

engage legal counsel far from the collision situs. 90

Third, both the bench and bar rely heavily upon preserved testimony and documentary evidence in modem collision litigation.
Attorneys for collision litigants can depose 91 key witnesses anywhere
92
in the world and introduce the depositions as evidence at trial.
Moreover, many relevant facts in collisions can be ascertained from
logs, dead-reckoning traces, radio voice recordings, and nautical
almanacs, 93 which can be used at trial under the Federal Rules of
94
Evidence.
Finally, in U.S. admiralty courts, the litigants try collision cases
85. Eg., Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d
754, [1954] Am. Mar. Cas. 643 (2d Cir. 1954), appealdismissedper stipulation, 348 U.S.
801 (1954) (English channel); Peoples Insurance Co. of China v. Theokeeter, [1975] Am.
Mar. Cas. 1711 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (high seas off Baja, California); Esso Transport Co., Inc.
v. Terminales Maracaibo C.A., 352 F. Supp. 1030, [1975] Am. Mar. Cas. 709 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (eight nautical miles off Venezuelan coast); Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T
Mina D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908, [1959] Am. Mar. Cas. 511 (E.D. Va. 1959) (high seas
off Spanish coast).
86. Olsen interview, supra note 84; e.g., Peoples Insurance Co. of China v.
Theokeeter, [1975] Am. Mar. Cas. 1711, 1712 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See generally McCoy,
The American Law of Collision Practice,Procedure,and EvidentiaryMatters, 51 TUL. L.
REv. 1002, 1003-05 (1977) (discussing importance of marine surveyors in collision cases).
87. Olsen interview, supra note 84.
88. Id
89. Id Interview with Marie L. Hagen, admiralty attorney, formerly with Dickerson,
Reilly, and Mullen, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Oct. 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hagen interview].
See also McCoy, supra note 86, at 1003-05.
90. Hagen interview, supra note 89.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 32. See Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S,
239 F.2d 463, 464, [1957] Am. Mar. Cas. 57, 59 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938
(1957) (vessel attached in rem and the crew deposed); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Lloyd Brasiliero
Patrimonio National, 85 F. Supp. 740, 741, [1949] Am. Mar. Cas. 684, 685 (E.D. N.Y.
1949) ("[I]t is notoriously true in the admiralty that in many cases the attendance of
witnesses is not to be had at the trials and that trials are very largely by deposition for
that very reason.").
92. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
93. See McCoy, supra note 86, at 1005-06.
94. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
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to a judge. 95 As a result, the trial is usually faster and less expensive
than a jury trial,96 the importance of live testimony is reduced, 97 and
to the extent that admiralty judges are more sophisticated and better
able than the juries to deal with the legal and factual subtleties of
international maritime collision litigation, fairer results are
98
produced.
3. Advantages of Suit in the U.S. Admiralty Courts
In view of the special features of admiralty law and international marine collision litigation, it is not difficult to understand why
collision claimants might desire to sue in the U.S. admiralty courts.
Foreign claimants may want to take advantage of favorable U.S.
substantive rules 99 or procedural devices, such as liberal discovery
and the admissibility of preserved testimony and records.c0 Additionally, they may believe that U.S. admiralty courts are more
sophisticated than alternative forums. I0 1 Further, it may be more
convenient for them to sue in the United States than in a more
remote alternative forum. 0 2 And finally, foreign claimants may prefer to sue elsewhere, but are forced to bring actions in U.S. admiralty
10 3
courts to attach particularly elusive vessels.
Similarly, U.S. claimants may also want to take advantage of
the more favorable law, greater sophistication, and in rem attachments available in the U.S. admiralty courts. 104 Moreover, it may be
more convenient for them to sue in the United States if their corpo95. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 35.
96. Time is saved merely by not having to select the jury.
97. The value of live testimony is that the jury can judge for itself the witness' credibility. Arguably, the judge, because of his legal training, can make that assessment
equally as well from depositions.
98. The facts of a collision may have to be pieced together from relevant logs, traces,
and almanacs, particularly where the testimony of various witnesses is conflicting or contradictory. Cf G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 500 (Even judges have difficulty "getting at the truth as to what happened in a collision case.").
99. See Note, ForeignPlaintf supra note 5, at 1267-68; see also supra notes 72 & 79.
100. Olsen interview, supra note 84. See, e.g., Metallgesellschaft, A.G. v. M/V Larry
L., [1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529, 2534 (D.S.C. 1973) (U.K. law does not provide for use of
depositions); Note, ForeignPlainiffs,supra note 5, at 1267 n.60 (U.K. does not allow
contingent fees). U.S. courts treat limitation of liability as procedural. The Titanic, 233
U.S. 718 (1914). Thus, foreign claimants may seek the protection of the U.S. limitation
statute. See supra notes 74 & 80.
101. Olsen interview, supra note 84. Such relative attributes include more liberal discovery, greater use of preserved testimony, and more numerous causes of action and
defenses.
102. Many foreign corporations and shipowners maintain offices or significant business contacts in the United States. See, e.g., Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. M/V Larry L.,
[1973] Am. Mar. Cas. 2529 (D.S.C. 1973). The United States may be relatively more
convenient than some third world forums. See infra note 135.
103. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
104. Olsen interview, supra note 84.
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rate headquarters are located there.10 5 These U.S. claimants will be
more familiar with the U.S. legal system, and trial in the United
States may be less expensive than it would be in a more remote alternative forum. 1°6 Finally, U.S. claimants may want to avoid the
10 7
potential bias of a foreign court against large U.S. corporations.
II
GULF OIL v. GILBERT: ITS RELEVANCE TO
INTERNATIONAL MARINE COLLISION
CASES
A. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/VNordic Regent
The liberal view10 8 of FNC in international litigation
culminated in Alcoa Steamship Co. v. MIVNordic Regent, a marine
collision case decided in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. 0 9 Alcoa, a New York corporation, owned an ore pier and
conducted business in Trinidad. 110 Norcross Shipping Company, a
Liberian corporation, chartered the vessel M/V Nordic Regent to
Alcoa for the purpose of carrying ore."' On January 2, 1977, the
M/V Nordic Regent entered Point Trembladora Harbor, Trinidad,
and crashed into Alcoa's pier causing $8,000,000 in damage. 112 At
the time of the accident, the vessel was not carrying a pilot, as
113
required by local regulation.
Alcoa filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis1 14
trict of New York and served process on Norcross' general agent.
Norcross moved for dismissal on the ground of FNC, alleging inconvenience of trial in the United States and possible prejudice because
of inability to serve the Trinidad Pilot's Association. 115 Alcoa
alleged conveniences in its own favor and indicated that Trinidad
law would allow Norcross to limit its liability to approximately
105. Olsen interview, supra note 84. But see generally, Note, Forum Non Conveniens
andAmerican Plaintiffsin the FederalCourts, 47 U. Cmi. L. REv. 373 (1980) (U.S. citizen-

ship does not serve as an adequate proxy for convenience in FNC analysis).
106. Olsen interview, supra note 84.
107. Id. See also Note, supra note 105, at 385; Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic
Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 162-63, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. 309, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
108. See supra notes 53-56 & 59 and accompanying text.
109. 654 F.2d 147, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. 309 (2d Cir. 1980).
110. Id at 149, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. at 311.
111. Id
112. Id

113. Id
114. Id at 149, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. at 312.
115. 453 F. Supp. at 11, [1978] Am. Mar. Cas. at 366. Norcross alleged that the Trinidad Pilots Association may have been liable and that Norcross intended to implead it as
a third party defendant. Id

138

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:121

$570,000.116
The trial judge ruled that convenience factors made trial in
Trinidad more appropriate and dismissed Alcoa's libel subject to
reinstatement if Norcross failed to submit to jurisdiction in Trinidad. 117 After a lengthy appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed."l 8 The

Court of Appeals applied Gilbert'sprivateandpublic interest factors
to the case and decided that litigation in Trinidad would be more

appropriate."

9

A two-judge dissent argued that Koster, rather than

Gilbert, provides the proper FNC standard in international admi-

120
ralty cases brought by a U.S. plaintiff.

The Nordic Regent decision generated controversy among commentators; most of them agreeing with the decision. 12' The decision
is troublesome, however, because it used convenience factors to jus-

tify declining jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen. Moreover, the decision
produces an anomoly because some circuits use a stricter FNC standard than Gilbert's for foreigners seeking access to U.S. admiralty
22

courts. 1

The following section presents two arguments for rejecting the
use of convenience factors to decline jurisdiction in international
maritime collision cases. First, the Supreme Court in Gilbert gave no
indication that it intended that case to govern international actions,
particularly where the claimant is a U.S. citizen. Second, the Gilbert
convenience factors are inapposite to the international marine colli-

sion context.
B.

THE INAPPLICABILITY OF GULF OIL COR. V GILBERT IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COLLISION CONTEXT

First, the Gilbert Court gave no indication that it intended its

decision to extend to international litigation. Dismissal was considered harsh enough even in the context of domestic litigation where
116. 654 F.2d at 159, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. at 327.
117. 453 F. Supp. at 13, [1978] Am. Mar. Cas. at 369.
118. For the procedural history of the case, see supra note 47.
119. 654 F.2d at 152, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. at 316.
120. Id at 162-63, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. at 333-34.
121. See generally Recent Decisions, supra note 3; Volk & Cordrey, supra note 80;
O'Brien,AdmiraltyCommentary, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 575 (1980); Note, FederalCourts.Forum Non Conveniens, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 404 (1979).

122. See, e.g., Poseidon Schiffahrt, G.M.B.H. v. M/S Netuno, 474 F.2d 203, [1973]
Am. Mar. Cas. 1180 (5th Cir. 1973), on remand, 361 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Ga. 1973) (federal
courts should exercise jurisdiction over in rem libels involving foreign vessels of different
nationalities unless defendant can establish that to do so would work an injustice);
Damodar Bulk Carriers v. A/S Det Dansk-Franske D/S, [1981] Am. Mar. Cas. 1734
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (in an action arising out of a North Sea collision between foreign flag
vessels in which inpersonamjurisdiction had been obtained over defendant, court should
not dismiss on FNC grounds even though defendant had already "won the race to the
courthouse" by suing in a foreign forum).
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the case could still be heard within the boundaries of the United
States. 23 It appears unlikely, then, that the Court wanted Gilbert's
private and public interest factors to dictate the results in internabecause it requires
tional litigation, where dismissal is harsher
124
renewing the action in another country.
It is even less likely that the Gilbert Court meant for its decision
to govern actions brought by U.S. plaintiffs in international maritime
collision cases.' 25 The FNC standards in Gilbert had been established in an action by a plaintiff outside his home state.' 26 Koster,
Gilbert'scompanion case, purported to state a stricter standard when
the plaintiff sues at home. 27 More importantly, neither Gilbert nor
Koster was an international admiralty case.128 Even with the stricter
Koster standard, a court could still dismiss a home-town plaintiff. In
admiralty, by contrast, the prevailing view was that U.S. claimants
had a constitutional right to sue in the United States. 29 Even three
years after the Gilbert and Koster decisions, Justice Frankfurter's
dictum in Swift indicated that the Court had not rejected the prevailing view of guaranteed access 30 in admiralty cases. Accordingly,
the Gilbert-Koster Court probably did not intend that its FNC 13standards apply to U.S. plaintiffs in international admiralty cases. '
Second, Gilbert'spublic andprivate interest factors are inapposite to FNC analysis in international maritime collision litigation.
Assuming two possible forums, balancing private convenience factors will rarely point to one forum as clearly more convenient than
the other.' 32 The majority of eyewitnesses in harbor collisions, and
all of the eyewitnesses in coastal-water and shipping-lane collisions,
123. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 516 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
Cf Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (Congress enacted § 1404(a) in order
to mitigate some of FNC's harshness).
124. Dismissal is harsher in the international context because the plaintiff is remitted
to a foreign forum. In international admiralty cases, dismissal may frustrate a legitimate
desire to sue in the United States, see supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text, and it
requires plaintiff to incur the expense of starting over in another forum. Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 589 (1953); Note, Foreign Plaintiffs, supra note 5, at 1258. The
plaintiff denied access to U.S. courts may face difficulties similar to those alleged by a
defendant in a FNC motion. Convenient Forum Revisited, supra note 1, at 757.
125. See Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 161-63, [1980]
Am. Mar. Cas. 309, 330-33 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
126. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
127. 330 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1947).
128. See supra notes 25-27 & 34 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
131. See Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, [1979] Am. Mar. Cas. 1, 3 n.3
(2d Cir. 1979).
132. See, e.g., Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel, G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal, 210
F.2d 754, [1954] Am. Mar. Cas. 643 (2d Cir. 1954), appealdismissedper stipulation, 398
U.S. 801 (1954) (convenience is about the same in either forum); Latif Barrany Jute
Mills, Ltd. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., [1976] Am. Mar. Cas. 2408 (S.D. N.Y. 1976) (no forum
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are mobile. 33 Surveyors and marine investigators are also mobile.
Although they are usually located in major ports, surveyors and
marine investigators are accustomed to extensive travel because collisions occur and claims are litigated all over the world. 134 Thus, for
the majority of witnesses, travel may be necessary regardless of the
forum that the plaintiff chooses. Moreover, the United States is the
world's transportation hub, and travel to it may be easier than to
35
other forum nations.
Additionally, collision claims can be litigated in the U.S. admiralty courts without the appearance of all witnesses. Litigants frequently use depositions and often reconstruct complex collisions
using documentary evidence and pertinent records. 136 Also, the
United States is a global communications center. Thus, counsel in
the United States are often better positioned to obtain information
and to coordinate pre-trial activities. Finally, the amounts of money
at stake in major marine collision litigation far exceed the costs of
37
transporting witnesses and documents to trial in the United States. 1
Gilbert'sprivateinterest factors thus have little relevance in measuring "convenience" in international marine collision cases. Most
witnesses in maritime collision cases are mobile, and the cost of
obtaining them is not significant. Often, no one forum provides better access to sources of proof than any other. Further, a view of the
premises is not always necessary in collision cases, and may be rendered insignificant in harbor-collision cases by the use of logs,
charts, photographs, and nautical almanacs.
Gilbert'spublic interest factors, on the other hand, are inadequate to measure the United States' interest in adjudicating a particular collision case. First, there is no imposition on the community to
provide jurors because admiralty cases are tried to a judge. 138 Second, few admiralty judges consider foreign law so difficult to untangle as to provide a reason for changing the forum. 39 Moreover, U.S.
would be more convenient for all parties). Cf. supra note 85 and accompanying text
(individual ship may have disparate national ties).
133. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
135. See Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147, 164-65, [1980]
Am. Mar. Cas. 309, 337 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890

(1980).
136. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
137. 654 F.2d at 164, [1980] Am. Mar. Cas. at 336 (Van Grafeiland, J., dissenting).
138. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Mann International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 67-68 (2d
Cir. 1981); Magnolia Ocean Shipping Corp. v. M/V Farco Azul, [1981] Am. Mar. Cas.
2071, 2076 (E.D. Va. 1981); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 454
n.37 (D. Del. 1978) (federal courts experienced in applying foreign law). Cf. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 478 (In seamen injury cases to which foreign law
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admiralty courts will apply U.S. substantive law in many collision
40
cases, and will always apply U.S. limitation of liability rules.'
Finally, many collisions occur at sea and involve parties of different
nationalities. 14 1 Thus, in such cases there is no single community
1 42
having an overriding interest in the litigation qua litigation.
Of the Gilbert public interest factors, only one is relevant to
international maritime collision litigation: docket-crowding.14 3 The
United States has an interest in relieving its courts of the administrative difficulties caused by collision litigation piling up in a few popular admiralty courts. 144 Nonetheless, that interest is minor in
comparison with other U.S. interests that are implicated when a
marine collision claimant sues in the U.S. courts.
Unfortunately, U.S. admiralty courts have not addressed, in the
context of FNC analysis, the U.S. interests that are implicated in
international marine collision cases; failure to articulate these interests has led to the misguided reliance upon Gilbert'sprivateandpublic interest factors. Moreover, this failure has contributed to the
current confusion in FNC as applied to international marine collision litigation. The following section articulates some of the U.S.
interests that should be relevant in FNC analysis in international
marine collision litigation, and suggests a more reasoned and predictable approach to FNC in that context.
III
FNC IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COLLISION
LITIGATION: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH
A.

U.S. NationalInterests to be Promoted Through FNC

The U.S. admiralty courts should apply FNC in international
maritime collision cases so as to advance U.S. shipping interests.
These interests are best promoted by (1) applying U.S. substantive
applies, U.S. courts often assume that U.S. and foreign maritime law are similar and thus
apply U.S. law.).
140. See supra note 74.
141. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text at note 32. Presumably, the U.S. courts would apply U.S. law for
want of a better alternative.
143. See supra text at note 32.
144. See supra cases cited at note 2. For a more detailed discussion of federal court
congestion, see Carrington, CrowdedDockets andthe Courtsof-Appeal: The Threat to the
Function ofReview andthe NationalLaw, 82 HAxv. L. Rav. 542 (1969); Clark,Aduidication to Administration: A StatisticalAnalysis of FederalDistrict Courts in the Twentieth
Century, 55 S. CAL. L. Rav. 65, 73-88 (1981); Landsman, The Decline ofthe Adversary
Systenv How the Rhetoric of Swoi and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in the

American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 487, 522 (1980).
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rules to the extent acceptable under current international conflict of
law principles, (2) making U.S. procedural advantages available to
all U.S. citizens and to other claimants who contribute directly to the
vitality of the U.S. economy, and (3) promoting international comity
so as to secure for U.S. citizens a favorable reception in foreign
courts.
B.

1.

FNC

ANALYSIS: PROMOTION OF

U.S.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

The Foreign Claimant

The U.S. admiralty courts should retain jurisdiction of foreign
claimants' international collision actions only where the plaintiff's
desire to sue in the United States coincides with U.S. shipping interests. 145 In general, U.S. shipping interests would be advanced by
entertaining actions by foreign claimants where the result would be
the maintenance of high navigational standards in U.S. territorial
waters, the application of U.S. substantive and procedural rules to
all U.S. shippers and shipowners, and the promotion of international
comity. Accordingly, the U.S. admiralty courts should retain jurisdiction of foreign claims where: (1) the foreign plaintiff is actually a
U.S. shipper or shipowner, as is true of flag-of-convenience vessels
substantially or wholly-owned by U.S. citizens; (2) the defendant is a
U.S. shipper or shipowner; (3) the collision occurred in U.S. territorial waters; or (4) retaining jurisdiction is necessary to promote international comity. In those cases involving only foreign parties or
collisions outside U.S. territorial waters, FNC analysis should focus
solely on considerations of international comity and should be used
to retain jurisdiction only where the U.S. forum is necessary to
enforce a foreigner's maritime lien in a vessel attached in the United
46
States. 1
2. The U.S. Claimant
In the case of a U.S. claimant, the primary objective is, again,
advancing U.S. shipping interests. Admiralty courts, regardless of
their nationality, advance U.S. shipping interests when they apply
U.S. substantive law or similar foreign law. U.S. claimants' access to
145. For the reasons that foreign claimants seek access to U.S. courts, see supra notes
99-103 and accompanying text. For the most part, they are similar to the reasons citizen
claimants bring suit in the United States. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
146. In many instances, the court can protect the claimant's security interest in the
attached vessel by making the defendant post bond and submit to jurisdiction in the
alternate forum before dismissal. See, e.g., Anglo-American Grain Co. v. S/T Mina
D'Amico, 169 F. Supp. 908, [1959] Am. Mar. Cas. 511 (E.D. Va. 1959) (court dismissed
for FNC on a showing of inconvenience where the defendant, an Italian shipowner,
agreed to post security and submit to jurisdiction in the British plaintiff's home forum).
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sophisticated forums and favorable procedural devices similarly promotes U.S. shipping interests. Thus, citizen claimants' desires to
take advantage of favorable U.S. substantive and procedural law
largely coincide with the United States' interest in advancing them.
Accordingly, as a general formula, U.S. admiralty courts should dismiss on FNC grounds only where such dismissal will neither subject
U.S. claimants to the application of an unfavorable foreign law nor
relegate them to an unsophisticated forum lacking favorable procedural devices.
U.S. claimants may desire to sue in U.S. courts for diverse reasons. Not all of these reasons warrant judicial recognition. 47 Primarily, U.S. claimants seek to take advantage of U.S. substantive
law, procedural devices, and court sophistication. 48 They also may
need to enforce maritime liens in attached vessels, desire the convenience of litigating at home, or wish to avoid the potential bias of
149
foreign courts.
Assuming the defendant has made a colorable showing that
U.S. shipping interests are not implicated, 50 U.S. citizens seeking to
litigate their international marine collision cases in U.S. courts
because they desire to take advantage of U.S. substantive law, procedural devices, or court sophistication, should be required to show
either: (1) that a dismissal will subject them to an adverse change of
substantive law or (2) that they require certain procedural devices
(e.g. liberal discovery; admissibility of recorded testimony and
records) unavailable in the alternative forum.
With respect to the question of sophistication, to some extent
the availability of advanced procedural devices suggests a court's
sophistication. Beyond that, a foreign court's level of sophistication
is conjectural. Perhaps it would be desirable from a policy standpoint to retain jurisdiction to protect U.S. claimants from unsophisticated foreign courts. As a practical matter, however, U.S. admiralty
courts have a limited ability to determine whether a claim will be
147. As an equitable doctrine, FNC should not permit one party to harass the other.
See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 55 (1948) ("He who seeks equity
must do equity . . . . One who seeks the affirmative aid of a court of equity will be

required, as a condition to the granting of such relief, to do such acts as equity requires
with respect to that matter.").
148. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
150. An international admiralty collision plaintiff should come into court with a presumption that his choice of forum is fair (at least as regards private party conveniences).
The defendant is thereby saddled with a burden of showing that the court should not
exercise jurisdiction. To discharge this burden, the defendant must make a showing that
no U.S. shipping interests are implicated by the facts of the case. If the defendant is
successful, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that U.S. shipping interests are
involved, and that retention is necessary to advance those interests.
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subjected to an unsophisticated foreign court and when a lack of
sophistication will operate to prejudice a U.S. citizen's claim. Thus,
the courts should not attempt to decide whether the alternative
court's level of sophistication permits an FNC dismissal.
U.S. claimants also may desire to enforce a maritime lien on a
vessel attached in a U.S. port. Usually, the need to enforce a maritime lien will be incidental to a U.S. claimant's desire to take advantage of the various characteristics of U.S. admiralty courts discussed
above. Occasionally, however, the only factor weighing in favor of
retaining jurisdiction will be a maritime attachment. In such a case,
jurisdiction should be declined only where the dismissal is conditioned on the moving party's posting bond and agreeing to submit to
jurisdiction in the alternative forum. 151
The U.S. claimant may also want to sue in the United States in
order to litigate at home, where lawyers and courts are familiar, or to
avoid the potential bias of foreign courts. In cases where the defendant has made a colorable showing that U.S. shipping interests are
not implicated, and where no other factors weigh toward retention,
courts should decline jurisdiction. The U.S. claimant's desire to be
in familiar surroundings has no relation to shipping policy. Thus,
the U.S. admiralty courts' interest in trimming its docket would take
precedence over a U.S. claimant's desire simply to be in familiar surroundings. On the other hand, the U.S. claimant's desire to be protected from the bias of foreign courts arguably implicates U.S.
shipping interests insofar as biased foreign courts may frustrate
otherwise valid claims. Nevertheless, the U.S. admiralty courts only
have limited ability to protect U.S. claimants from foreign court
bias. For these reasons, U.S. admiralty courts usually should dismiss
when a U.S. claimant desires to sue in the United States solely to be
in familiar surroundings or to avoid foreign bias and the defendant
has shown that no U.S. shipping interests are implicated.
Finally, a U.S. admiralty court should decline jurisdiction if it
finds that a U.S. claimant brought an action in the United States
solely to coerce a settlement. Declining jurisdiction in such cases
will promote international comity and, thereby, indirectly promote
U.S. shipping interests by securing for U.S. collision claimants a
more favorable reception in foreign courts.
151. The Second Circuit required the defendant in Mf/VNordic Regent to submit to
jurisdiction in Trinidad by conditionally dismissing the plaintiff. 654 F.2d at 159, [1980]
Am. Mar. Cas. at 329.
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CONCLUSION
Current FNC doctrine, as applied in international maritime collision cases, is confused and changing. Some U.S. admiralty courts
have adopted a virtualper se rule against dismissal.' 52 Others have
adopted a liberal rule ofreason approach, using Gilbert'sprivate and
public interest factors. 53 Neither approach is adequate.
The per se approach is inadequate because in some international maritime collision cases there are legitimate reasons for
declining jurisdiction. The rule of reason approach is inadequate
because it is not clear that the Supreme Court in Gilbert intended a
liberal use of FNC in the international context, particularly where
the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen, and because the Gilbert factors are
inapposite. The private interest factors do not adequately measure
convenience in modern international maritime collision litigation.
Thepublic interest factors are inadequate to measure the U.S. interest, in terms of shipping policy, in adjudicating particular collision
cases.
This Note recommends that the U.S. admiralty courts replace
current FNC doctrine in international maritime collision cases with
the following three policy considerations. The considerations are
listed in decreasing order of significance: (1) advancing U.S. shipping interests by applying U.S. substantive law to the extent possible
under conflicts of law principles; (2) protecting U.S. citizens by
affording them access to liberal procedural mechanisms, and (3) promoting international comity.
Applying these considerations, U.S. admiralty courts should
decline jurisdiction to non-citizen claimants whose cases do not
implicate U.S. shipping interests. Where claimants are U.S. citizens,
however, U.S. admiralty courts should retain jurisdiction if dismissal
would result in a foreign court's applying less favorable substantive
law or would subject the U.S. claimant to less favorable procedural
protections.
Edwin W Dennard

152. See supra notes 48-52 & 58 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 53-56 & 59 and accompanying text.

